Time and Cross-Temporal Relations - Giuliano Torrengo

Time and Cross-Temporal Relations

Giuliano Torrengo




According to both ordinary and scientifi c thought, two objects can enter into relation not only simultanously, but also at different times, namely cross-temporally.
For instance, we understand comparisons between entities as they are at different times, as when we say that John is now taller than Michael was three years ago; causally related events often are not simultaneous, and objects of perceptions and perceivers usually have different temporal locations (we see ordinary things as they were few milliseconds ago, we see the sun as it was eight minutes ago, and so on).
However, many philosophers consider language and thought about cross-temporality deceptive. Relations, according to the “standard view”, can hold only between things existing at the same time. In this book I defend the opposite view, according to which relations can be cross-temporally instantited and thus cross-temporal talk must be taken seriously. The theory is based on the idea that persisting in time is tantamount to possessing temporal parts at different times, and its central tenet is that persisting entities (objects and events alike) are cross-temporally related by having distinct temporal parts entering into relations.


Acknowledgements, p. 9

I. Time and Relations, p. 13. I.1 Changes, Comparisons, and Cross-Temporality, p. 15 – I.2 Do we need Cross-Temporality?, p. 16 – I.3 The Expressibility Problem, p. 20 – I.4 Temporal Parts Analysis of Cross-Temporality, p. 22
II. Detecting Cross-Temporality, p. 24. II.1 What you see is not what you get, p. 24 – II.2 What you get is not what you see, p. 25
III.Plan of the Work, p. 27

I. The General Semantic Framework, p. 33. I.1 Formal Semantics, p. 35 – I.1.1 The Model p. 39 – I.1.2 Semantic Rules and Intensional Operators, p. 39 – I.1.3 Indexicals and Parameters, p. 37 – I.1.4 Parsing and Evaluating, p. 47 – I.3 Context and Circumstances: Two Roles of the Parameters, p. 49
II. Context and Time, p. 53. II.1 Propositions, p. 53 – II.2 Relativized Propositions and Relativized Evaluations, p. 55 – II.3 Tensed Propositions and Tenseless Propositions, p. 56 – II.4 Time Focus and Kernel Propositions, p. 63
III. Truth-Conditions and Time, p. 68. III.1. Tenseless Truth-conditions, p. 68 – III.1.1 A Remark on Tenses and Indexicals, p. 73 – III.2 Tensed Truth-Conditions, p. 75 – III.3 Multiple Temporal Focus, p. 78 – III.4 Cross-Temporal Claims and the “No-splitting” Problem, p. 81 – III.5 The Scope of Tenses, p. 84

I. Introduction, p. 89
II. Realistic and Anti-Realistic View About Persistence, p. 92. II.1 Three-dimensionalism and Four-dimensionalism, p. 92 – II.2 Persistence and Exemplification, p. 96 – II.3 Temporal and A-temporal Predication, p. 99 – II.4 Temporal Predication and The Articulation of Content, p. 102 – II.5 Relativization of the Predicate, Copula Tensing, and Adverbialism, p. 103 – II.5.1 Relativization of the Predicate and Relativization of the Term(s), p. 104
III. Cross-Temporal Instantiation, p. 107. III.1 Instantiating Relations, p. 107 – III.2 Temporal Relations and Temporal Parts, p. 108 – III.3 Cross-temporal Relations, p. 110

I. Introduction, p. 117
II. Realism and Anti-Realism About Time Dimensions, p. 118. II.1 The Present, the Past, and the Future, p. 118 – II.2 Ontological and Metaphysical Realism, p. 119 – II.3 Presentism, p. 124 – II.3.1 Presentism Explained, p. 124 – II.3.2 Ontic and Factive Presentism, p. 126 – II.4 Presentism and Relations, p. 127
III. Eliminativism, p. 131. III.1 Biting the Bullet, p. 131 – III.2. Presentism and Moorean Evidence, p. 132 – III.3 Van Inwagen and Identity Across Time, p. 134 – III.4 “Internalism”, p. 138 – III.5 Quasi-truth and Humean Supervenience, p. 141 – III.6 The Sentential Connective Account, p. 146
IV. Non-Eliminativist Approaches, p. 150. IV.1 The Relativization Strategy, p. 150 – IV.2 Relational Properties, p. 154

I. Introduction, p. 161. I.1 Introductory Remarks, p. 161 – I.2 Factive Realism, p. 163
II. Realism and Anti-Realism About Tenses, p. 167. II.1 The Debate, p. 167 – II.2 Perspectival Contexts, p. 172 – II.3 “No-splitting” Problem Revisited, p. 178 – II.3.1 The Problem, p. 178 – II.3.2 The Received View, p. 182 – II.3.3 Alternative Solutions, p. 183 – II.3.4 Cross-temporally Tensed Relations, p. 187 – II.4 The “No-cohesion” Problem, p. 193
III. The Grounding Problem, p. 198. III.1 Presentism Again, p. 199 – III.2 Presentism and Truth-value Links, p. 201 – III.2 Presentism and “Ontological Cheat”, p. 212
IV. The Myth of Simultaneity, p. 219

Bibliography, p. 223