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Due ontologie della realtà storica. Documentalità e intenzionalità collettiva alla prova della storicizzazione

Realist ontologies about history stress that entities such as documents, their sources, and events whom they are talking about are objectively given in the ontological reality of social history, beyond our skills to recognize them. Thus, how is it possible to understand the extension of the ontological independence of historical findings and where does our (mis)interpretations of those findings begin? As every realist ontological commitment *must* provide us with a suitable tool to solve the age-old problem of findings' reliability, in this paper we analyze how such realist views, like Searle's Collective Intentionality, cannot be a solution, meanwhile, on the other hand, other realist purposes could represent valid alternatives. In fact, Searle's theory surely accounts for the constitution of such social objects as false historical acts, but its definition of *function of status* (FS) as "X count as Y in C" permits, even only in principle, that the same entity X, which has counted as Y, in the far-off times historical context C_0 , could "re-count" as $Y \neq Y$ in a more recent context $C_1 \neq C_0$, after an involuntary forgery too. Being *by definition* iterative, FS could iterate clamorous twists, also *ad libitum*, making future historians' shared intentionality lose the contact with the reality of original status' functions. On the contrary, Ferraris' Documentality satisfies this historical reliability test, because its definition of a social object as *inscription of an act* distinguishes between what a fact/event/object X of the past *has been*, and what characteristics this same X must possess to become a document, discerning, this way, *voluntary* from unintentional effects of the creation of an object/event/fact, to instantiate a social fact, or to cause an historical event, and their different *taxa* of historicity.